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In her paper, "What Do Animals Care About?," Lilly-
Marlene Russow argues for two theses. The frrst is that 
the arguments of Frey and Leahy fail to establish that 
animals do not have interests in a morally relevant sense. 
I think she is successful in defending this thesis. Less 
convincing is her second thesis, namely, that we are 
better off focusing on the question of what animals 
care about than continuing to speak of the interests 
that animals have. While Russow's criticisms of 
behaviorism are persuasive, she offers no compelling 
grounds to accept her suggestion that computers might 
well have desires. Since computers lack nervous 
systems and are not conative organisms, it seems 
implausible to think they have desires. Russow is also 
too casual in assuming that we can simply set aside 
extreme skepticism. She gives no hint of how this can 
be done in a philosophically adequate way. But the main 
question I want to focus on is: What do specific 
nonhuman animals specifically care about? 
Let me begin by reflecting in some detail on 
Russow's claim that "The undeniable fact is that 
experienced observers can tell quite well when an 
animal is happy." I am trained as a professional 
philosopher and not as a professional cat-handler, but I 
do fancy myself an experienced observer of feline 
behavior since I have lived with two cats for about 
thirteen years of my life. I think that for any 
investigation of what animals care about, it is important 
to address specific, concrete examples of what 
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panicular animals mayor may not care about. So, now 
I will consider what sorts of things my cats care about. 
I decided to adopt a pair of kittens about four years 
ago. I thought it better to have two cats rather than one 
since I believed that a solitary cat would be less happy 
than a cat with a playmate. I agree with Russow that 
using words like "happy" and "content" to describe 
nonhuman animal behavior is, though scientifically 
unmeasurable, still philosophically justifiable. When I 
went to the Omaha Humane Society to see a litter of 
six-week-old kittens they had told me about over the 
phone, I was shown a litter offour kittens, three females 
and a male. Since I thought I could not easily manage 
four growing cats, I decided to adopt the three females 
while hoping that someone else would adopt the male. 
Thus, my frrst decision was to separate the orphaned 
siblings. Did the three sisters care about being separated 
from their brother? All four kittens were mewing loudly 
at the time, which I interpreted as distress, but perhaps 
their distress was due to their uncomfortable surroundings 
at the Humane Society or the previous loss of their 
mother, and not their separation from their brother. 
Soon after bringing the three kittens home, I tried 
to put small collars with their identification tags on 
them. They reacted by (frantically?) leaping about, 
arching their necks, and struggling to pull the collars 
off with their paws. I inferred from this behavior that 
they didn't much care for the collars, and so I promptly 
removed them. A week or two later, one of the kittens 
began to have diarrhea My veterinarian diagnosed her 
as suffering from a gastro-intestinal infection, and he 
supplied me with medicine for her. Sadly, the 
medication failed to cure her ailment. Despite my 
efforts, she stopped eating entirely, became very weak 
in a short time, and died on a Sunday evening before I 
could take her to the vet the next morning. Had the 
unfortunate kitten stopped caring about food? Hours 
before she died, her two sisters huddled with her just 
as they had often done before when all three were 
healthy. Did the two surviving kittens care about their 
sister dying? I could not judge either way from their 
behavior since they neither attended closely to the dead 
kitten nor avoided it in any obvious way. They simply 
seemed to ignore it. 
As is usually the case, the two cats, Bryseis and 
Chryseis, developed quite distinct personalities. Bryseis, 
the more athletic cat, exhibits a strong interest in 
exploring the basement, going outside, and drinking 
from sinks, the toilet, and the tub. Chryseis, in contrast, 
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seems not to care about the basement, the out-of-doors, 
or drinking from places other than her water bowl; 
Chryseis cares much more aboutbeing fed canned rather 
than dry cat food. Do I have a moral obligation to let 
Bryseis go outside? Making them wear collars as kittens 
seemed to make them quite unhappy. So, since Bryseis 
still remains collarless and untagged, I am reluctant to 
let her become an "outdoor" cat. If I allowed her to 
roam free in my neighborhood, I would expose her to 
the risk of fights with other animals, serious injury, or 
even death from being struck by an automobile. Am I 
justified in seriously restricting her liberty as I do? 
Cats are predators, after all, and her telos as a cat 
certainly includes sniffmg outdoor scents, stalking birds, 
chasing insects, and hunting small herbivores. 
Therefore, she might well be more content freely 
exploring the outdoor environment for hours every day 
than staying indoors all but a few minutes every week 
when I closely supervise her limited excursions 
outdoors. Does Bryseis care about living a long, safe 
life indoors? Or would she be much happier roaming 
the neighborhood unimpeded by my paternalistic, 
protectionist interference? Would she return home if I 
let her outside on her own? And if she did not, would 
she be happier as a stray? How am I to interpret her 
behavior so as reasonably to judge what would make 
her happiest? Would there be, to use Russow's words, 
"a high degree of intersubjective agreement, at least 
among skilled, trained. experienced practitioners" about 
what would most contribute to Bryseis' happiness? 
Consider another behavior. My cats have developed 
the all too common "vice" of clawing the furniture, 
despite my conscientious efforts to trim their claws 
regularly. If I decided never to allow them outside on 
their own, then they would never need their claws to 
defend themselves from attack by hostile animals. Do 
cats care about being declawed? 
Another element of the telos of cats is surely to 
reproduce. Do female cats care about being spayed? 
Are feline mothers who nurture kittens happier than 
their spayed sisters? Do male cats care about being 
neutered? Are promiscuous tomcats happier than their 
neutered, more docile brothers? Or do we have a 
paternalistic justification for spaying and neutering dogs 
and cats in order to minimize the nmnber, and the usual 
suffering, of strays? 
Russow suggests that "a definitive criterion of what 
we care about (as opposed to what we think we care 
about) is that it contributes to our happiness or alleviates 
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our unhappiness." Given the behavior my cats exhibit 
when I am away from home for long periods of time, 
surely they would be happier, and not just think 
themselves happier, were I to spend more time at home 
with them. Does this suffice to establish that I have a 
prima facie duty to spend more time at home with my 
cats? Russow proposes the following definition: lOS 
cares about 0 if and only if S directly desires 0, and 
getting or achieving 0 contributes to S's happiness." 
This definition seems inadequate for two reasons. 
First, while it may seem to capture our ordinary concept 
of caring about inanimate objects, I think it fails to 
describe our ordinary concept of caring about other 
sentient subjects. Many humans, and perhaps many 
intelligent nonhuman animals as well, care about other 
sentient beings for their own sakes, and not only because 
the company of those subjects contributes to the 
happiness of the individual who is doing the caring. I 
offer the following definition of intersubjective caring: 
S1 cares about S2 if and only if S1 desires to 
promote the happiness or well-being of S2' 
whether SI and S2 are conspecifics or sentient 
beings of different species. 
Let us return to my stock example. Do my cats care 
about each other (and me) in the same sort of way that 
they care about being fed canned cat food and having a 
clean litterbox? If so, then when they play with each 
other they care about each other the same sort of way 
they care about a paper clip or a pair of socks when 
they play with these things. I am not inclined to construe 
their caring about each other so narrowly. They exhibit 
reciprocal altruism when they groom each other. Such 
reciprocal altruism suggests to me that they may well 
care about each other's well-being to some extent. That 
is, Bryseis may well care about the subject Chryseis, 
an individual with her own well-being, rather than 
merely caring about the object Chryseis, a thing that 
contributes to Bryseis' happiness. 
The second reason to hesitate accepting Russow's 
definition of "caring about" is that she is imposing it as 
a stipulative definition that does not, in fact, "accord 
well with our ordinary concept of caring about" even 
when "0" refers exclusively to objects. For example, I 
could on some occasion care about having some . 
cheesecake. Later, after I find and eat a piece of 
cheesecake, I could well discover that having it did not 
make me happy but, rather, made me sad for failing to 
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keep to my diet. It would be wrong to say in retrospect 
that I didn't really care about having the cheesecake in 
the first place. Rather, we should say I no longer care 
about having more cheesecake because, having 
committed dietary sin, I now care more about returning 
to my diet. In short, I do not see how Russow's 
distinction between "caring about" and "thinking we 
care about" does more work than the distinction between 
"taking an interest in" and "successfully promoting 
one's self-interest." To say that smokers take an interest 
in smoking, but smoking is not really in their self-
interest, strikes me as more in accord with our ordinary 
concepts than saying that smokers think they care about 
smoking, but do not really care, since smoking does 
not contribute to their long-term happiness. Similarly, 
to say that my cat Bryseis takes an interest in roaming 
free outside, but roaming free outside is not really in 
her self-interest, makes more sense to me than to say 
that Bryseis thinks she cares about roaming free outside, 
but she does not really care, since it probably endangers 
her long-term happiness. 
Russow has made a decent attempt to advance the 
discussion of how best to talk about animals' interests, 
desires, and happiness. However, her proposed 
defmition of"caring about" fails to mark the qualitative 
difference between caring about an object and caring 
about a subject and does not, in fact, accord well with 
our ordinary concept of caring about generally. 
Moreover, since Russow's discussion is deficient at the 
theoretical level on these points, its application to 
questions about specific animals-for example, whether 
housecats care about being allowed to stray outside, 
being spayed or neutered, etc.-is not promising. 
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I could respond by answering Professor Stephens' 
specific questions about his cats: either offering a 
judgment about what they do and don't care about, or 
explaining what one would do to determine that. But 
that would fill up all the remaining time, and miss his 
deeperconcerns. Instead, I'll say just a few words about 
two more general concerns that he raises, either 
explicitly or implicitly: 
(1) how we can determine the object of intentional 
states, including caring, and 
(2) why "caring about" is an improvement over talk 
about interests. 
I take it that the philosophical issue underlying 
Stephens' questions about what his cats care about in 
specific incidents is the concern that there may be no 
legitimate way of answering these questions. The full 
answer to his concern would be too complicated to lay 
out in detail-not because he's asking about cats, but 
because specifying the object of any mental state is a 
complicated business. Nonetheless, I'll try to indicate 
some of the factors that should be involved. 
First, sometimes de re specifications ofmental states 
are the most appropriate ones. That is to say, we can 
say that Chryseis believes ofStephens that he is a source 
of food, without claiming or being committed to 
anything about how he is "represented." The same is 
true of other propositional attitudes, especially caring 
about. Thus, it is certainly reasonable, and perhaps even 
necessary, at times to read "Chryseis cares about 
Stephens" as a de re attitude. 
Even if there is good reason to demand a de dicto 
account of a mental state, there still may be good 
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